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APPLICABILITY OF EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Antonio Ojeda Avilés, Seville 
1. AN ACCELERATED MIS EN SCENE 
As if trying to announce the 10th anniversary of the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, in 1998 the first European 
collective agreement is signed (henceforth, ECA) on the sector level, 
on the working time of seafarers, between the European Community 
Shipowners' Association and the European Transport Workers' 
Federation I . Prior to it, several framework agreements on the highest 
level between European social partners had cleared the way for these 
sector agreements, several of which already exist e. In the space of a 
few short years, the European collective bargaining panorama has 
changed drastically, perhaps rendering obsolete the opinions voiced 
with caution for so long about the applicability of tose instruments. 
Thus, a revision of the subject is necessary, though of course it cannot 
be the final one. Not only do an considerable number of European 
intersectoral and sectoral agreements currently exist, the Commission 
has just updated its list of representative organisations in the various 
industries', and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
seems to be comfortable with the new Helsinki statutes where it finds 
the basis needed for more standardised bargaining. The content of 
said collective agreements has also changed, as we will have the chance 
Signed in Brussels on 30 September 1998. 
2 The most recent example — for the moment — is the European Agreement 
on Guidelines of Telework in Commerce, signed in Brussels on April 21, 2001 by 
EuroCommerce and Uni-Europa Commerce, whose dubious legal nature I will 
address further on. 
Paper by the Commission called European Social Dialogue, a Force 
for Innovation and Change, Brussels, 26 June 2002, COM (2002), 341 final, 
annex I. 
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to examine in the following pagel. At the same time, the Commission 
is asking itself about the nature of the agreements that are inexorably 
appearing in multinational firms and European workers' delegations. 
In short, there is a new panorama, where employers have been quick-
er to organise than the trade unions 4 and there are as many as 27 
sectoral dialogue committees, although bargaining itself is not with-
out its difficulties5. 
Before moving on to reflect on questions directly related to the 
applicability of ECAs, we must make, then, a brief digression to 
discuss the origins and distinguishing features this new phenomenon, 
which is reaching maturity right before our very eyes. 
1.1. The origins of European collective bargaining 
It has been repeated ad nauseum that collective bargaining 
emerged on the Community leve) with sector agreements on working 
hours in agriculture, reached by the European joint committee for 
that industry from 1968 onward 6. This gave rise to a more general- 
In the previously cited Commission paper (Annex I). there are 38 European 
employers' industry organisations, verses 12 European trade union organisations, 
most of them not affiliated to the ETUC, as consulted in article 138 TEC. 
3 In 1995 the Commission consulted the European social partners about a regu-
lation of burden of proof in cases of gender-based discrimination, and it obtained 
separate opinions, for which it pronounced Directive 97/80/EC, actually based on 
the Social Policy Agreement annex of the Maastricht Treaty. Bargaining on labour 
flexibility, initiated in 1995, achieved both framework agreements on part-time 
work in 1997 and foced-term work in 1999, but those referring to part-time emplo-
yment companies failed in May 2001 after a long time attempting to reach an agree-
ment, and on other matters there have been more failures than successes, as can be 
seen in the Commission consultations of 1996 (prevention of sexual harassment of 
employees in the workplace), 1997 (information and consultation of workers), and 
2000 (three reviews: protection of workers versus the insolvency of the employer, 
protection against asbestos, and safety and health in the workplace for self-emplo-
yed workers), which received separate opinions and resulted in Directives in most 
cases. For information about the current situation of the consultation about the pro-
tection of personal details and social aspects of company restructuring, see the chap-
ters on European collective subjects and social dialogue in this book. 
6 It is the second oldest joint sectoral committee (1963; European Commission 
Decision 74/422/ECC, reformed by Decision 87/445/EEC), only preceded by the 
coal and steel committee (1955). Currently made up of representatives from 
EFFAT (trade unions) and GEOPA-COPA (employers' organisations). It is one of 
the 27 advisory committees of sectoral and bipartite character that comprise the 
institutional participation in the EU, the first of which can be seen in RIBAS J. J.; 
JONCZY, M. J. and SÉcuÉ, J., Derecho Social Europeo, Madrid, 1980, pp. 196-7. 
The agreements were signed in 1968, 1972, 1978 and 1981. The 1968 agreement 
establishes the working hours of permanent workers in agriculture, and the 1972 
agreement for zootechnics. 
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ised acceptance of the validity of such agreements, usually considered 
as mere recommendations aimed at the national social partners'. The 
object of these joint committees is to formulate the sector' s economic 
or commercial policies for relations between Member States and up 
against non-Community countries, no matter how often they take 
stances having indirect relevance to employment relationships 8. In 
effect, the European Agricultura) Trade Union Federation itself ad-
mitted, referring to these agreements, that they were intended as 
«European recommendations» in the sense given to framework agree-
ments, setting objectives for national collective bargaining °. But as 
Bercusson has pointed out, the absence of an effective European 
employers' organisation in that sector and a lack of interest in devel-
oping something beyond vague joint opinions kept impeding the 
European Community' s efforts to develop social dialogue on the 
sector leve) I°. In reality, as Rocella and Treu have accurately pointed 
out, they were «joint recommendations,» forms resembling the bona 
fide collective agreement, significantly developed in a sector where 
Community authority has invested conspicuous resources, following 
lines of common economic policy, although still very much tributar-
ies of national interests 11 . 
Also worthy of mention are the joint opinions signed between the 
main European confederations UNICE, CES and CEEP, baked by the 
European Commission in Val Duchesse. As a product of these tripar-
tite meetings 12 during the summit, very interesting opinions were 
produced about questions ranging from employment (1986) and cross-
industry advisory committees (1993) to occupational training (1995) 
without any intention of regulating working conditions in the sense 
that a collective agreement does 13. As Lyon-Caen and Guarriello point 
out, the parties reach agreement not on a rule understood as binding, 
' SCHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, "1 contratti collettivi in un'Europa integrata", 
RivltDirLav 1 (1993), 333. They do not have regulatory effects, he argued, because 
Mey do not have an immediate bearing on employment relationships, since applying 
the contract to the parties as such, being third parties, cannot be derived from the 
agreement. 
ROCELLA, M. and TREU, T. Diritto del Lavoro della Comunitá Europea, 
Padova, 1995, p. 371. 
9 BERCUSSON, B., European Labour Law, London, 1996, p. 83-4. 
BERCUSSON, ibid., p. 84. 
Diritto del Lavoro, p. 372. 
17 Backed by the European Union (European Social Action Programme of 
1984), which, however, does not take part in them, refers to that kind of virtual 
tripartism where one party — usually the government — commits and finances, 
but remains formally on the sidelines. 
13 The Reports from 1986 to 1995, in MTAS, El Diálogo Social en la Unión 
Europea, Madrid, 1997, pp. 49 et seg. 
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but on an opinion ". Tripartism takes on new functions with the bi-
annual meetings between the European confederations and the troika 
starting in 1997 and the social summits of Stockholm, Laeken and 
Barcelona (2001 and 2001). However, it does not bring them closer, 
but perhaps even drives them further away from the missions of 
collective bargaining. 
Neither agreements on working hours in agriculture nor the opin-
ions on specific aspects from the Val Duchesse meetings can be con-
sidered as the origins of what we know as European collective agree-
ments. The argument for this conclusion stems from the absence of 
a will to regulate working conditions in what their own authors re-
garded as recommendations or reports, not to say pure and simple 
desiderata. And such a will could not have existed since one of the 
signing imites, the employers, had no organisations with bargaining 
power, nor were they willing to authorise a the UNICE or the CEEP 
to sign collective agreements. Even in the 1995 Framework Agree-
ment on parental leave, specific authorisation had to be given to each 
confederation belonging to the UNICE'• a mandate that the British 
employers' association CBI refused, without any consequence at the 
time beyond preventing its application in the UK. It was only in 1987 
that the Single European Act, with its incorporation of article 118 B 
and its support via the Commission of European social dialogue and 
collective agreements on this level, did the necessary phases for the 
emergence of European collective agreements start to appear. This 
was followed by the Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights, pushed along by a powerful personality, Commissioner V. 
Papandreou, article 14 of which clearly states that the right to bargain 
and sign collective agreements implies that "relations based on agree-
ments may be established between the two sides of industry at Euro-
pean level if they consider it desirable," and that these agreements can 
cover employment and working conditions and the corresponding 
social benefits. 
In this brief digression about the antecedente, I should mention, 
as a major milestone, the Social Policy Agreement (SPA) reached in 
1992 as an annex to the Maastricht Treaty, where the 11 signing 
countries declare their desire to continue along the route plotted by 
the 1989 Social Charter. The SPA proposes a trilogy of European 
14 G. and A. LYON-CAEN, Droit Socjal International et Européene, Paris, 1993, 
p. 333, and GUARRELLO, F., Ordinamento comunitario e autonomia collettiva. 
dialogo sociale, Milan, 1992, p. 375, cited by ROCELLA and TREU, Diritto del 
lavoro, p. 375. 
15  Agreement of 14 December 1995, based on the Social Policy Agreement, 
which initially excluded the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. 
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collective agreements: those that substitute Community standards
'  those reinforced by Community standards, and those resulting from 
a transposition of Community standards 16. Leaving out the latter type, 
for which the SPA confirms the possibility that national agreements 
may bring about the transposition of Community rules, a role ques-
tioned by the Court of Justice on several occasions 17 , the other two 
types are trae novelties in European social Iaw, with more than a few 
problems when it comes to their application which seem to be getting 
worked out with practice, as we will see over the course of this ar-
ticle. Here I will only say that, although they might look like a single 
type of agreement, inserted in the process of the elaboration of a 
Community standard that will later be promulgated anyway, but in 
connection with the agreement, what we are really witnessing are two 
independent types, initially linked to the point of giving the impres-
sion that they comprise a single body with two elements. I will go 
into more detail on this later. 
With the SPA, we already have all the necessary ingredients for 
European collective agreements to be made. We will still see two 
failed attempts at collective regulation on the basis of its mechanisms, 
when the Commission consults the European social partners about 
their willingness to bargain an agreement about European works 
councils and about burden of proof in cases of gender discrimination, 
and receives a negative reply in both cases, giving rise to Council 
Directives 94/45/EC and 97/80/EC, respectively ". 
The Amsterdam Treaty of October 1997 incorporales into ordi-
nary Iaw the typology of European collective agreements of the SPA 
(articles 137, 138 and 139 TEC), but it goes one step further: in the 
new article 136 TEC, express mention is made to the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 1989 and social dialogue 
becomes an objective of the Community and the Member States. The 
16 Cf. my article "La negociación colectiva europea," RH II (1993), 1249 et 
seq. 
17 For example, in the ECJ sentence of 30 January 1985, Commission v. the 
Kingdom of Denmark C 148/83, with respect to the transposition of Directive 75/ 
117, about pay equity between men and women. Also, ECJ rulings of 8 June 1982, 
Commission v. the Republic of Italy C 91/82; 10 June 1986, Commission v. the 
Republic of Italy C235/84; 21 October 1999, Commission v. Grand-Duchy of 
Luxembourg. Cf. on this issue, CASAS BAAMONDE, M. E., "Directivas comunitarias 
de origen convencional y ejecución convencional de las Directivas: el permiso 
parental," Relaciones Laborales 11 (1996), 85 et seq. 
18 More specifically, the statements of legal grounds for both indicate that "at 
the end of the second phase of the reviews, the social partners did not inform the 
Commission of their willingness to initiate the process that could lead to the signing 
of an agreement, as it is laid out in article 4 of the Agreement." 
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Nice Treaty of February 2001 does not introduce any significant 
novelties as far as European collective bargaining goes. 
1.2. Distinguishing features 
In my opinion, collective bargaining really takes off with two 
important Directives, the ones that emerged after, and based on, the 
SPA: the Directive on Working Time 93/104/EC, one of the few that 
managed to get passed in that period of renewed concern about social 
matters in the Community, and Directive 94/45/EC, on European 
works councils. 
The former represents an important new twist in many ways: it 
meticulously and peremptorily regulates a number of questions about 
working time, which will earn the Council a lawsuit in the Court of 
Justice by a certain affected country 19; it constantly remas to national 
or regional bargaining to determine certain aspects; also, it contains 
a mysterious article 14 that envisages the non-application of the 
Directive in the event that "other Community instruments" establish 
more specific regulations pertaining to particular professions or ac-
tivities. Most likely, the individuals who drew up the Directive were 
not so clear, when they presented it, about which Community instru-
ments it might be referring to. It is even feasible that they actually 
had other specific Directives in mind, of the type developed in 89/391 
on matters relating to safety and health in the workplace. However, 
the Community strategy gave centre stage to collective bargaining for 
the regulation of working conditions, though we can't be sure if it 
was to scrupulously comply with the mandate of promoting social 
dialogue, to apply the principie of subsidiarity, or to back off on a 
particular subject — working conditions — about which it had always 
shown its mistrust. In my opinion, the Commission reacted to the new 
elements it did not have at its disposal before. Namely, the willing-
ness to bargain that the employers' organisations had assumed since 
the SPA — the 11 signing countries free of the usual British ball and 
chain — showed them the Council' s eagerness to pass Community 
laws that would have been unthinkable a short time earlier 2°. 
19  I am referring to the ECJ sentence of 12 November 1996, United Kingdom 
v. Council of the European Communities C84/94. The Directive about informing 
the worker 91/533, which precedes it, is also sufficiently specific, but the matter 
regulated does not allow it to be overly extensive. 
20  The most recent example is found with working hours for the highway 
transport sector: though industry federations in the area of aerial navigation and 
maritime transport had both reached agreements, the European highway transport 
As for the latter, the European works councils started to persist-
ently bargain all kinds of agreements about the progress of compa-
nies, theoretically aimed not so much at working conditions as at their 
sustainabilily in labour terms, real enterprise agreements whose char-
acteristics deserve a specific chapter in this book. Here we will focus 
our attention on intersectoral (cross-industry) and sector agreements, 
which in a short time have made the following headway: 
a) The first to appear, and the most abundant, are intersectoral 
ECAs of a framework variety, referring to a specific issue for all 
sectors and bargained by representatives from the European trade 
union confederations and employers' associations 21. In turn, these can 
be subdivided according to their relationships with the Directives on 
the same subjects: 
1. Framework ECAs with an accompanying Directive, which 
covers most of those mentioned 22. 
2. Framework ECAs without an accompanying Directive, a 
group only made up, so far, by only one on telework, the most recent. 
b) A bit later on, and as the result of negotiations between Eu-
ropean industry federations, emerge the first sectoral agreements, in-
itially as an extension of the Directive on Working Time, which as 
we have already seen, which proclaimed themselves to have subsid-
iary application against more specific Community provisions'. It is 
not long, however, before an autonomous sector agreement appears, 
on telework in European commerce'. These agreements can also be 
representatives failed in their attempts: "despite intense negotiations between social 
partners, it has not been possible to reach an agreement with respect to mobile 
workers in the highway transpon sector," was the wording of the statement of 
reasons of Directive 2002/15/EC of 11 March, which as a result of this was passed 
by the Parliament and the Council. 
21 Framework Agreement on Parental Permission, of 14 December 1995, signed 
by CES, UNICE and CEEP; Framework Agreement on Pan-time Work of 6 June 
1997, signed by CES, UNICE and CEEP; Framework Agreement on Fixed-term 
Work of 18 March 1999, signed by CES, UNICE and CEEP. 
22 See previous note. Directive 96/34/EC on parental leave; Directive 97/81/EC 
on part-time work; and Directive 99/70/EC on temporary work. 
Sectoral ECA on the working time of seafarers of 30 September 1998, signed 
by the organisations European Community Shipowners' Associations and the 
European Transpon Workers' Federation (ETF); Sectoral ECA on working hours 
for flight personnel in civil aviation, of 22 March 2000, signed by the organisatio-
ns Association of European Airlines (AEA), European Transport Workers' Fede-
ration (ETF), European Rrgions Airline Association (ERA), European Cockpit 
Association (ECA) and International Air Carrier Association (LACA). 
24 Of 26 April 2001, signed by Eurocommerce and UniEuropa Commerce, 
already cited. 
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broken down into two categories, just as we have done with the in-
tersectoral agreements. 
1. Sectoral ECAs accompanied by a Community standard, also 
the majority here, these being ECAs deriving from the Directive on 
Working Time which in turn provoke the promulgation of other 
specific Directives ". 
2. Sectoral ECAs without an accompanying Community stand-
ard, for the time being only the one on telework in European com-
merce. 
Needless to say, the biggest novelty in the recently described 
scenario is agreements that lack an accompanying Community stand-
ard, both in the category of framework agreements as well as in the 
sectoral agreement category. 
Another noticeable trend in the group of European bargaining 
instruments and their "speculative" Community regulations — of these 
we should mention not only the accompanying ones, but also those 
passed after the failure of bargaining to reach an agreement — , I 
think it is important to point out the progressively detailed nature of 
their texts, as it can be seen by simply comparing the framework ECA 
on parental leave with Directive 2002/15/EC, which punishes the 
social partners of road transpon for not having known, or wanted, to 
bring their negotiations to a successful conclusion. 
2. THE MYSTERIES OF THE TREATY 
2.1. How many types of collective European agreements? 
Setting aside transposed national agreements, European to the 
extent to which they internalise a European-level rule, and whose 
consecration as valid instruments is found in article 137 TEC, there 
are still interpretative problems regarding what the Treaty was seek-
ing in terms of purely European agreements. It has usually been 
admitted that articles 138 and 139 of the TEC allude to only one type 
of collective agreement, since the first remits to the second when the 
social partners decide to inform the Commission of their willingness 
to "initiate the process provided for in article 139". This phrase might 
zs Two to reinforce the ECA on the working time of seafarers: Directives 1999/ 
63/EC and 1999/95/EC, due to the fact that the Agreement basically reproduces 
articles 1 to 12 of the OIT 180 agreement about seafarers, still not in force, and 
one for the ECA on working hours in civil aviation, Directive 2000/79/EC. 
be interpreted to mean that it remits to the next article in its entirety, 
and consequently that it recognises a willingness to bargain an agree-
ment, which would weaken the draft of the Community standard on 
the same matter, and the application of which could either be made 
via the social partners' own procedures or based on a Council deci-
sion adopted at the Commission's suggestion. There would be a con-
tinuum between these two articles, such that an agreement substitut-
ing a Community action would invariably be reinforced by another, 
giving the agreement a scope similar or identical to the thwarted 
Community standard. One gets the impression that the Treaty does 
not envisage that the signing parties to the agreement might fail to 
make a joint request for a reinforcing Community standard, since the 
offered alternative consists of applying the agreements through col-
lective instruments. This is specified in Declaration 27, annex to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which indicates that the social partners' own 
procedures, alluded to in article 139, actually refer to collective 
bargaining subject to the regulations of each Member State, without 
each State being required to directly apply the agreements, enact their 
transposition rules, or even modify national legislation. 
We could arrive at a somewhat more open interpretation, howev-
er, of the phrase "initiate the process provided for in article 139" if 
we consider that the remittance refers exclusively to the first section 
of this article, the part where it says that the dialogue between social 
partners may result in collective agreements. Thus, the second section 
would be "liberated" from it, in such a way that the application of the 
agreements concluded on the Community level could be done via 
intemal collective bargaining or through the support of an EC deci-
sion. The tendential unity between the substituting agreements and 
the reinforced ones would thus be broken, and any other European 
collective agreement could be accompanied by an EC decision, not 
only the substituting agreements. The Commission's reiterated inter-
est in publishing the lists of general and sector organisations that it 
considers to have representative authority will help facilitate the 
procedure of identifying which European agreements might seek to 
obtain the backing of Community law, which would not have much 
of a point if we knew in advance that only substituting agreements 
deserve this kind of support. 
On the other hand, it is too easily understood that collective 
agreements can only substitute a Community standard. Article 138 
fails to make such a clarification, as it always refers to "Community 
action," which could just as well mean a regulatory action as a merely 
administrative one. 
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The previously cited Declaration 27, in short, narrowly restricts 
the possibilities of European agreements, by specifying that they can 
only be applied via Community decision or internal collective bargain-
ing. If article 139 says that the agreement can be applied through the 
social partners' own procedures, the Declaration at least seems to sug-
gest that it is referring to internal agreements when it indicates that 
the direct State application of European agreements is not possible. 
These and other shadowy parts of the TEC can and should be 
explained by the origins of its articles 138 and 139 and its Declaration 
27. None of these saw the light in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. 
Rather, their origins can be traced to the Agreement on collective 
bargaining entered into on 31 October 1991 between CES, UNICE 
and CEEP 26, which was later included in the Social Policy Agree-
ment annex of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as a binding standard for 
11 EC countries, and after that to the foundational Treaty via the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. Declaration 27 originated with the incorpora-
tion of the terms agreed upon by the European social partners in 1991 
into the 1992 Social Policy Act 27. The limitations of the current TEC 
consist, therefore, in the failure to anticipate the new forms that 
European collective bargaining was going take starting in the second 
half of the Nineties. The fact is, the TEC text derives from, I repeat, 
what was agreed by the social partners in 1991 when Commissioner 
Papandreou' s regulatory thrust obliged the UNICE to accept, as a 
lesser evil, a bargained rule before an imposed role 2%. Thus, in reality, 
the intentio legis of articles 138 and 139 is merely to prevent Com-
munity regulatory drafts initiated by the Commission from being 
brought to a good end by substituting them with agreements bargained 
by European social partners. This also explains the emphasis placed 
26  The European organisations CES, CEEP and UNICE had reached the agree-
ment on collective bargaining and Community regulation in the ad hoc group 
promoted by the Commissioner V. Papandreou, and is contained in articles 3 and 
4 of the Social Policy Agreement "in almost exact tercos": MOLINA GARCÍA, M., La 
negociación colectiva en Europea. Entre el acuerdo colectivo y la norma nego-
ciada, Tirant, Valencia, 2002, p. 37. The SPA contains "the substantial parts of 
the previous Agreement of 31 October 1991, signed by CES, UNICE and CEEP", 
indicate COLINA, M.; RAMÍREZ, J. M. and SALA, T., Derecho Social Comunitario, 
Tirant, Valencia, 1995, p. 559. The text of the 1991 Agreement on proposals for 
drawing up articles 118, 118A and 118B, in MTAS, El Diálogo Social en la Unión 
Europea, cited, pp. 85 et seq. 
2  It was about, as you will recall, the Declaration of the 11 High Contracting 
Parties relating to section 2 of article 4 of the Social Policy Agreement, added by 
the Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992. 
28 It was also a personal bet between two energetic personalities, Commissioner 
Papandreou and the Secretary General of the UNICE, Tadeua Tyskiewicz, which 
ended with the transaction referred to in this article. 
by article 138 on the stimulated emergence of said agreements, as an 
upshot of a Commission communication announcing its intention to 
initiate proceedings for a Community action. And as the bargained 
substitution can result in a mere neutralisation of the planned meas-
ure, the panorama is completed with the "strong" possibility of an 
accompanying decision, perhaps to dispel the doubts of the ceding 
authority. 
This is the rigid scenario that is seen in the early years, as each 
time the Commission announces a project for a Community standard 
a substituting agreement is reached, which only pretends to establish 
a few general rules; a framework agreement. This is overcome with 
sectoral agreements on working hours, which in turn substitute Direc-
tive 93/104, as I have already mentioned. However, it is a much more 
autonomous substitution, in the sense that they neither avoid its ex-
istence — they only weaken its application for certain sectors — nor 
do they crop up as part of the stimulating procedure of the SPA, but 
rather on the basis of the standard on health and safety. Later, we will 
see new scenarios with the non-stimulated framework agreements —
or, if another name is preferred, independent or ordinary — such as 
the one on telework, which are not reinforced by Community stand-
ards either, and Community standards passed after the failure of 
bargaining between the social partners, such as 2002/15/EC. Of 
course, the scene gets cloudier with the signing of certain instruments 
that call themselves agreements, but which only propone mere recom-
mendations to the Commission or the national bargainers. 
Fortunately for us, articles 138 and 139, as well as Declaration 
27, are drawn up leaving sufficient room to make up from the de-
scribed overflowing. Now seems like a good moment to identify the 
loopholes in both articles before moving on to other questions: 
a) Substituting agreements of article 139.1 TEC do not require 
the backing of a Community decision in the sense stipulated in article 
139.2. 
b) European agreements do not necessarily need to be of the 
substituting variety to obtain the backing of a Community decision of 
article 139.2 TEC, in their application to the Member States. 
c) The application of European agreements can also occur 
through collective bargaining, according to the rules of each Member 
State. This does not necessarily require the intervention of national 
or internal agreements, as we will discuss later on. 
d) Neither the articles nor the Declaration mention ordinary 
agreements; that is, those that arise as an autonomous manifestation 
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of the European collective partners, without no intention of substitut-
ing a Community rule or being accompanied by one. 
2.2. Collective European pseudo-agreements 
Within the so-called European social dialogue, we mustn't limit 
ourselves to regulatory agreements, aimed at regulating working 
conditions or employment relationships between collective parties. 
We must take into consideration that the variety of instruments is 
sometimes much more extensive, including non-statutory types that 
we should keep separate from the agreements analysed here 29. 
It could even be said that historically the non-legal instruments 
appear first, stricto sensu agreements being a quite recent offshoot, 
still in the minority. The number of joint options and recommenda-
tions signed by the European confederation and sector parties is very 
high 30, and have not dropped of late, a moment in which they accom-
pany binding agreements. 
Unfortunately, while the instruments called joint options or rec-
ommendations clearly show their nature of mere proposals to the 
Commission, Member States or national bargainers, or simple expres-
sions of opinion, the ones that call themselves agreements do not 
always reflect in their articles the nature they are supposed to have —
and it doesn't matter at this point if it is a `self-executing' or an 
indirectly binding agreement — . I am not talking about the typical 
distinction within a collective instrument between its obligational and 
regulatory parts, since in reality this distinction is always artificial, 
although the first is aimed at the signing parties themselves with its 
compulsory clauses and in the second at the affiliates with the regu- 
29 SCHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, G. warned about this in "I contratti collettivi in 
un 'Europa integrataa'", Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro I (1993), 328, that 
the reference in 118 B TEC (introduced by the European Single Act of 1986) that 
European social partners could have contractual relationships contrasts with article 
4.1 of the SPA of 1992, which speaks of "contractual relationships, including 
agreements", which leads us to the conclusion that the concept of agreement is 
higher than that of contractual relations, and that only the former can result in the 
"integrated procedure" contained in arts. 3 and 4. According to the same author, 
agreement relations have an inferior legal nature and shall remit to the establish-
ment of presuppositions to organise future bargaining, as well incentives for the 
development of pre-bargaining. 
1° The joint opinions, recommendations and statements of Val Duchesse and 
their continuators are already numerous, and they are not faz behind commerce 
and agriculture sector agreements, to cite a few examples. In the Web sites of these 
organisations, especially the trade unions, the texts of most of these can be seen. 
latory clauses. Even in agreements where only commitments for the 
signing parties are considered, the document has legal force. Instead, 
I am referring to other documents called ECAs whose clauses are so 
gentle that they resemble, if they are not identical to, joint options 31. 
These are the so-called "new generation" texts (letters, codes of con-
duct, agreements), which express commitments to be applied on the 
long term 32. And if they lack formal imperativeness, what we might 
call material imperativeness is worthless, which gives the signing 
parties the capacity to impose their mandates about employment re-
lationships, which is the second element to be taken into account. 
I will mention three recent examples of the confusion produced 
by these ambiguous terms: 
— The Agreement (sic) about fundamental rights and principies 
at work 33 repeatedly indicates in its text to be referring to a joint 
statement, which seems to be different from joint opinions, if only 
in a tiny variation in the narre. However, article 1 clears up the fog 
by saying that the signing parties recommend their national organi-
sation members to encourage companies and workers in European 
commerce to comply, whenever possible, with the fundamental rights 
set forth in the OIT Agreements, in particular the elimination of hard 
labour, the abolition of child labour, the elimination of discrimina-
tion and the rights to unionisation and collective bargaining 34. 
— The European agreement (sic) on guidelines for telework in 
commerce " offers a more complex content, as it contains useful 
delimitations for the regulatory mission — for example, telework has 
a definition that could come in handy when distinguishing between 
similar figures — , it shows the determined willingness of the signing 
parties to respect the principie of equality and proportionality be-
tween teleworkers and other comparable workers, and confirms the 
It is the content of the clauses, and not the formal or express attribution of 
binding effects which gives the ECA legal effects: "the question is whether it has 
compulsory effect, or if it serves to orient the legislator and the judge in acting 
on and interpreting the Directive.", as ARRIGO; G. indicates in "A propósito dell 
comparazione nel diritto comunitario del lavoro," Il Dirittio del lavare 1-2 (2002), 
p. 76. 
32 This is what the EC communication on European social dialogue, a force 
for innovation and change, ct., p. 18, calls them. 
33 Agreement on Fundamental Rights and Principies at Work, signed in Brussels 
on 6 August 1999 between EuroCommerce and Euro-FIET. 
34  It adds that the signing organisations will regularly debate about the appli-
cation of the joint statement, and if necessary will make recommendations or carry 
out any pertinent actions (!). 
13  European Agreement on Guidelines on Telework in Commerce, signed in 
Brussels on 21 April 2001 by EuroCommerce and Uni-Europa Commerce. 
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teleworker's right to be informed of the basic terms of his or her 
contract. It also envisages the treatment of the workplace and tele-
workers' right to communicate with their colleagues and particípate 
in union acts and meetings, among other questions. Moreover, it 
contains a surprising article 5 that recommends national organisa-
tions, whether they decide to regulate telework separately or include 
it in existing agreements, to include the guidelines of the European 
agreement I am referring to. In addition, most of the labour rights are 
expressed with a "should be applied" or "should be assumed", which 
do not indícate they are compulsory. In my opinion, an Agreement 
like this would have to be classified as hybrid, part recommendation 
and part regulatory agreement, as it is not made sufficiently clear 
which parts are binding and which others are merely declarative. 
— The recommendation framework agreement on the improve-
ment of paid employment in agriculture of the Member States of the 
Union ' contains numerous recommendations about working hours 
and other conditions for bargaining conducted on the national, re-
gional or provincial leve137. Its final declaration gives us an idea of 
its programmatic nature on the very long term: the signing of this 
Framework Recommendation Agreement by GEOPA/COPA and 
EFA/ETUC — it says — is the crucial first stage of the process 
of jointly improving the position of paid employees in agriculture. It 
represents an act of mutual trust by the signing parties and makes 
it much more probable that they will be able to successfully face the 
challenges they come up against on the eve of the third millennium. 
Such ambiguities can be overcome, however, when the dubious 
collective instrument obtains the backing of a Community rule. The 
EC rule breathes life into what was born a weakling. In doing so it 
can say that some clauses are not sufficiently detailed, or that they 
have a provisional character, but we will always bet talking about a 
"collective" rule. I will return to this question in a moment. 
The question takes on a new complexion when the signing parties 
do not ask the Community authorities to enact a back-up Community 
standard, or when the Council decides by majority or unanimously to 
reject the request, which means that the Agreement will have the 
binding effect deserving of it alone. Not only the kind of applicabil- 
Brussels, June 24 1997, signed by GEOPA/COPA and EFA/ETUC. 
31 "The annual working time established by national, regional or provincial 
agreements shall not exceed 1,827 hours per year," it says, for instance. Beyond 
its orientative or programmatic Iiteralness, the omission of other levels of bargai-
ning, like local or enterprise, are surprising in the Recommendation Framework 
Agreement. 
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ity, but even the very nature of these autonomous or ordinary agree-
ments is under debate. 
In the fines that follow I will take a look, first of all, at the legal 
situation of collective agreements accompanied by an EC regulation 
and secondly, at the possibility and applicability of those that do not 
have this backing. 
3. REINFORCED AGREEMENTS 
3.1. Do they always have to be stimulated by the Commission? 
Article 138 TEC seems to suggest that always, in all cases, Eu-
ropean collective agreements must originate as a response to a Com-
munity action initiative that the social partners decide to substitute, 
for whatever reason, with their own action. Thus, the Commission 
will consult with the social partners, and these will respond with an 
opinion or a recommendation in which they announce their willing-
ness to initiate the process provided for in article 139. And this article 
states that the European social partners can reach agreements, and that 
the application of these can occur via procedures of their own or via 
a Council decision. Bearing in mind both articles, it seems that the 
panorama opens up on the way out, but not on the way in; in other 
words, there are two possibilities for applying the agreement, but they 
can only originate with a Commission initiative to which the social 
partners respond with their agreement. I have already mentioned that 
since its beginnings in the 1991 agreement, the intention of this pro-
cedure has been to substitute the planned Community standard 
through a collective regulation. Thus, it seems logical not only that 
the ECA emerges reactively, on the defence, but also that it is on the 
level of a Community rule owing to its compliance with the tercos of 
article 139. 
The meteoric evolution from that period until the present has 
surpassed the legislator' s intention by far, giving a new dimension to 
the two TEC articles around which these ideas revolve. The interpre-
tation of a standard cannot remain anchored in the historical moment 
when it carne into being, but should be fuelled by the social reality 
of the moment when it is applied 38. The two agreements on the work-
ing time of seafarers and civil aviation crews in the measure men-
tioned aboye have been spontaneous, not stimulated; and equally 
38  As the Spanish Civil Code states in article 3.1. 
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spontaneous has been the agreement on telework in commerce. The 
difference between the first two and the second lies in the fact that 
the former have obtained the backing of EC regulations, while the 
latter does not seem to have either requested or obtained it ". The trail 
has been blazed for the possibility of non-stimulated agreements, and 
it truly does seem logical in every way for the social parties, whether 
they be confederate or sectoral — although with even more reason, 
the latter — not to wait for the Commission to initiate preliminary 
steps if they deem it advisable to reach an agreement on some issue. 
The interpretation of articles 138 and 139 TEC bring us to the 
same conclusion. If section 1 of article 138 orders the Commission 
to adopt all necessary provisions to facilitate dialogue between social 
partners, at the same time section 1 of the following article states that 
Community social dialogue can lead to agreements of this level. The 
spirit of this statement should not be interpreted as an imperative 
mandate to bargain, going against all the Community's philosophy of 
freedoms, but as the EC legislator's desire to see this practice flour-
ish. Neither of the sections, as fas as I understand them, envisages an 
incitement by the administration, although it comes from European 
levels; however, they do point out that the agreements are recognised 
even in the event that they are not guided by Community action. The 
fact that in another spot in article 138 a remittance is made to article 
139, which I interpret as its section 1, does not necessarily imply that 
this section is, for that reason alone, confined to the opportunities 
offered by Commission initiatives, nor that all ECAs have to match 
the thirst for blocking incipient Community action. The invitation to 
bargain can in no way be understood as sine qua non legitimation, 
since this would mean a limit incompatible with the objective of social 
dialogue contained in article 136 TEC. 
Thus, there is the possibility of non-stimulated ECAs; that is, 
agreements arising spontaneously from social dialogue, without any 
intervention whatsoever by the Commission. Both these as well as the 
stimulated agreements can obtain the backing of a Community reg-
ulation, as the contents of sections 1 and 2 of article 139 are inde-
pendent, as we have seen. To clear up any possible doubts that this 
is so, we must only have a look at the back-up decisions, particularly 
the function they perform in the regulatory structure. 
39 However, the Framework Agreement on Telework of 16 July 2002 was 
motivated by a reaction to the second phase of consultations by the Commission 
on the modernisation and development of employment relationships, with a formal 
invitation to social parties to initiate bargaining on telework, accepted in a similarly 
formal manner by the parties on 20 September 2001. 
3.2. The accompanying Community decision 
If the concept of Community action is ambiguous, for whose 
substitution bargaining is sometimes initiated by the social partners, 
equally or more so is the concept of Community "decision" announced 
to accompany certain European agreements, when the Council agrees 
to this a qualified majority or unanimously, depending on the case". 
The doctrinal possibilities that arise around the SPA range from those 
who thought that the "decision" referred to the usual kind of rule 
found in European social laws, the Directive, to those who thought 
that it should be interpreted in its technical sense, as a Council De-
cision, as well as others who defended a new, different meaning for 
the word 41. The main problem stemmed from the fact that the Direc-
tives granted erga omnes applicability to European agreements that 
could inhibit bargaining in certain cases and for certain countries 
where the effects of bargaining activity had been traditionally restrict-
ed to affiliates of the signing parties. The Decision, on its part, had 
no such pretensions, and its statutory character directed at specific 
targets allowed its applicability to be adjusted to the desires of the 
social partners, without it being any different, on the other hand, from 
other cases in which a Decision reached millions of people in the EU. 
In practice, we see that the Decisions described in the TEC are pub-
lished in the OJEC and many of them have a plural, although not 
general, target: for instance, those referring to matters such as ten-
ders, official announcements, subsidies, etc., whose field of applica-
tion at times affects many Europeans their defining identity resides 
— argues Boulouis — in the absence of general scope 43.  
40 The Commission, in its Communication about the application of protocol on 
social policy, COM (93) 600 final, dated 14 December 1993, carefully avoids com-
menting on the nature of this measure, at the most calling it a "legislative instru-
ment" (p. 16). 
41  See the different doctrinal stances in my article "Los euroacuerdos reforzados 
y la naturaleza de la decisión del Consejo," REDT 62 (1993), pp. 855 to 867, and 
in PÉREZ DE LOS Cosos ORMUEL, F., El derecho social comunitario en el tratado de 
la Union Europea, Civitas, Madrid, 1994, pp. 150 et seo. 
42  This is the case, among many others, of the Council Decision 93/465/EEC 
(OJEC of 30 August) about the system of placing and use of the term "EC", which has 
no express target in its articles, although its is directed at European "manufacturers" in 
its annex. The Council Decision of 24 June 1992 (OCEJ of 26 August), about the Eu-
ropean Year of Older People, aimed at "public and prívate operators", although it 
doesn't show a precise target in its articles either. Or Council Decision 93/379/EEC 
(OJEC of 2 July) on a multi-annual support program for small and medium-sized 
undertakings (SMU), with a diverse range of measures, without stipulating a specific 
target, although in the Annex it can be deduced that it is all SMUs as a whole. 
43 Boutouts, Droit institutionnel des communautés européennes, Paris, 1991, 
p. 181. For more details on the type of Decision, please refer to my article "Los 
euroacuerdos reforzados y la naturaleza de la decision del Consejo," cited aboye. 
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Since then, the Commission seems to have opted for symmetry in 
the type of accompanying regulation: if the ECA was substituting a 
Directive, it had to be another Directive that would reinforce it. Thus, 
the ECAs that have popped up in recent years as a reaction to the 
process for drawing-up Directives have been paired with Directives 
and only with Directives. This left the question of what would happen 
when the draft of the rule to be substituted was a Regulation or a 
Decision. Confirming the message of the facts, in 2002 the Commis-
sion seems to have adopted a broad position, imposing conditions on 
the responses to "the nature of the instrument used (Directive, Reg-
ulation or Decision)". Now then: is disparity between the substituted 
Community rule and the reinforced one possible if, for example, the 
first is a draft of a Directive and the other a Decision? The identities 
of the two are not distinguished in the articles of the TEC, and there 
are reasons to respond favourably to the use of a variety of instru-
mente. This depends on the function that the reinforcement standard 
should carry out. 
3.3. Function of the Community accompanying rule 
There are at least three official European Commission texts from 
which we can glean what we might call a real interpretation of the 
legislator's intention regarding the objective of the reinforcing stand-
ards: the EC Communication of 1990, on the application of protocol 
on Social Policy 45; that of 1998, about adapting and promoting of 
social dialogue on the Community level", and that of 2002, about 
European social dialogue as a force for innovation and change 47. 
Although they present differing opinions and state them incidenter 
tantum, for which reason they should only be regarded as a sporadic 
surfacing of thought, they do indicate the Commission's willingness 
to produce accompanying standards, ruling out any other possible 
directions. Of course, we are talking about official Commission an-
nouncements, so regardless of how they appear, they do have to be 
considered as firm and conclusive assertions. 
The 1993 Communication insists that the Council's decision will 
be limited to making compulsory the provisions of the agreement 
" Commission communication on European Social Dialogue, a Force for 
Innovation and Change, cited, p. 19, referring to the follow-up of the application 
of the Council decision. 
45 Communication of 14 December 1993, COM (93) final. 
46 Communication of 20 May 1998, COM (98) 322. 
47 Communication of 26 June 2002, COM (2002) 341 final. 
reached by the social partners". By the same token, the 1998 Com-
munication says at one point in its text: "It must be stressed that the 
Commission does not present a legislative proposal to the Council to 
make an agreement binding if it thinks that the signing parties are not 
sufficiently representative in relation to the object of the agree-
ment" 49. On its part, the 2002 Communication analyses the applica-
tion of an ECA by Council decision, stating the following: "In that 
case, which is a procedure for extending agreements negotiated and 
concluded by the social partners, the Council is required to take a 
decision on the social partners' text without changing the substance" ". 
Thus, the latter document seems to show that the Commission has 
changed the meaning given to the accompanying standards. If this 
judgment seems too harsh and we don' t believe there has really been 
a change in stance, but rather a certain degree inconsistence or wa-
vering with respect to their function, we would have to admit that the 
Commission has expressed at least two equally valid opinions on the 
matter. The reinforcing regulation may be geared towards a vertical 
consolidation of the ECA, in the sense of giving it binding force, or 
it may be aiming for a horizontal consolidation or erga omnes appli-
cability of the agreement. The Commission does not seem to have 
made up its mind, however, in acknowledging its role of making the 
ECA a source of law, something which has been the subject of lively 
debate in scientific doctrine 51. A role of source of (public) law that 
neither corresponds to it nor is it necessary for it to be able to regulate 
working conditions in European enterprises. 
As I said earlier, the Treaty does not specify the function assigned 
to these accompanying regulations. Most likely, the Commission's 
wavering in stating its opinion on the matter is due to fact that both 
functions are perfectly valid and possible. I will explain myself in a 
few brief words. 
48 Op. cit., p. 18. 
49 Op. cit., p. 16. 
" Op. cit., p. 19. 
51 "Horizontal subsidiarity would turn the system of Community sources bac- 
kwards, making the ECA the main source of social law, while heteronomous 
sources would serve to sanction, substitute and or/integrate the will of the parties," 
says GUARRIELLO, "Accordi di grupo e struttura di rappresentanza europea", Gior-
nale de Diritto del Lavoro e di Relazioni Industriali 53 (1992), pp. 58-59. For 
a look at the different stances, see my article "La negociación colectiva europea," 
Relaciones Laborales // (1993), 1260 et seo. For the Commission, on its part, "on 
the rnid-term, the development of the European social dialogue raises the question 
of European collective agreements as sources of law. The discussions on the 
forthcoming reform of the Treaty should take this into consideration" (Communi-
cation about European Social Dialogue, A Force for Innovation and Change, cit., 
p. 19). 
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The accompanying regulation has a primary effect, which consists 
of granting binding force, not understood as regulatory conversion, 
as an ECA does not turn into a Directive just because the accompany-
ing regulation remits to its text, but understood as an obligating force 
for the States, which are required to transpose the Agreement through 
internal regulations or national collective bargaining. This is how 
everyone has viewed it from the beginning, and the Commission has 
overseen the internalisation of the reinforced agreements almost as if 
they were Directives. This resulted in the initial weakness of the ne-
gotiations and the very content of the early ECAs, which were of the 
framework variety and rather ambiguous, leaving several options open 
to adapt to national peculiarities. As I see it, the binding force bor-
rows from German law the immediate and unappealable effectiveness 
of collective agreements 52. But this binding force cannot be the same 
for European ECAs, which in the early Nineties couldn' t dream of 
having immediate, compulsory application throughout Europe: even 
though at that time, the biggest detractors of this kind of applicability 
would be left out, as the United Kingdom had not signed the SPA and 
did not join it until the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 '. Anyway, it was 
too early to assume that a framework agreement of these characteris-
tics could be applied directly, and the Directive, with its own idiosyn-
crasies, could not give it this force either, although it could give it 
something very similar: the force of its interna! application. An appli-
cability that the ECA in itself does not have, being a private instru-
ment, but which with the backing of the Community standard is tied 
to the national public powers. The final result is similar to binding 
effectiveness, as it obtains automatic, unappealable application for 
employment relationships, though not in a direct or self-executing 
way, but through the transposition standards and agreements. 
The sectoral agreements that crop up in 1999, however, are no 
longer so weak or hazy, but very concrete, and the reinforcing norm 
is now seen as a carrier of a different validity: erga omnes applica- 
51 	application (unmittelbare Geltung) means that the regulatory part 
of the agreements is applied to employment relationships without the need of their 
being included in individual employment contracts, as if they were objective rules, 
and unappealable application of said party (zwingende Geltung) means that it is 
applied in this way even when the individual parties express they are against it or 
have established different clauses, although in this case the more favourable clauses 
would take precedente (in melius). Cf. KEMPEN, O. E. and ZACHERT, U.; Tarifver-
tragsgesetz, Bund Verlag, Koln, 1997, pp. 595 et seq., commenting on anide 4.1 
TVG. 
53  On the need for contractual incorporation of conditions regulated by agree-
ment, in British law, cf. DEAKIN, S. and MORRIS, G., Labour Law, Butterworths, 
London, 1998, p. 258 et seq. 
tion, the obligation of Member States to guarantee the universal 
application — at least within the corresponding sector — of the Eu-
ropean agreement clauses through the declaration of extension that 
the Community standard procures. However, the binding validity is 
threatened in part because of technical doubts raised by the applica-
tion of national doctrine to an international instrument, and also 
because the European social partners slowly assert their power over 
the member organisations, as demonstrated in the Helsinki Confer-
ence of 1999, though with the disagreement of some national dele-
gations. The explanation for general applicability can be found in 
Community law, essentially concerned with fair competition, under 
the parameters of which social dumping on these matters cannot be 
tolerated, and it seeks in the reinforcing regulation a means to impose 
a standard with the working conditions of the ECA. 
In effect, granting general application to an ECA also implies an 
attempt to make it binding. I cannot imagine the extension of a col-
lective instrument lacking in obligating power. Of course, we might 
envisage an ECA extended as a supplementary regulation, to be ap-
plied only when the national standards or agreements establish noth-
ing to this respect, but so far agreements of this kind represent the 
minority, however important. What may indeed happen is, as it often 
occurs with the extension mechanism in the different national legal 
systems that have established this, the Community standard assumes 
that the collective instrument has in itself this obliging power, and 
adapts its intervention to this assumption. The European Commission 
can state in its Communication, therefore, that the reinforcing Direc-
tive serves to extend the application of an ECA to all workers and 
employers, even those not affiliated to the signing European organ-
isations, an extension mechanism that respects the degree of binding 
force the instrument' s authors intended it to have, as it is aware that 
all the elements necessary to deem that the social partners have enough 
power to impose application of ECAs themselves are already present. 
Of course, the aforementioned raises two questions: one, whether 
the Commission really thinks as it says; and two, if the European 
social partners really have the power that it is assumed that they have. 
Save for an error or omission, I do not know of a Commission pro-
nouncement where we can find traces of its thinking. It has heartily 
congratulated itself on the success of the implementation of new joint 
sectoral committees for social dialogue, and is striving to create bar-
gaining forums on all levels, but it jealously guards its opinion on the 
legal and sociological power of the ECAs. On severa! occasions it has 
indicated the requirements that an ECA must meet to obtain the 
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backing of a Community standard, but it has not provided any cines 
to help us answer the following questions: 
a) Sufficient representativity of the contracting parties. 
b) Legality of each clause in the agreement. 
c) Respect for provisions regarding small and medium-sized en-
terprises. 
d) Mandate of the signing parties to conclude the agreement 54. 
We find the clue of this confidence in bargaining power in anoth-
er place, namely, from the social partners themselves. The social part-
ners have learned to bargain at the cross-European level as a result of 
the first framework ECAs and the commitments assumed for the im-
plementation of European works councils, from which 400 emerge as 
an immediate consequence of Directive 94/95/EC ". As a symptom of 
this confidence, there have already been agreements for which the 
Commission has not been asked to provide a reinforcing regulation. 
Without a doubt, this abstention might owe to the erga omnes appli-
cability assigned to the mechanism, contrary and even strange to the 
normal situation of the various European countries; the declaration of 
extension is an unusual procedure where it exists", and only in Spain 
do the most representative collective agreements have, ab initio, gen-
eral applicability. But it is also clear that they would not reject it if 
they were incapable of having some kind of impact on their own. 
There is intense sectoral bargaining currently underway which has still 
not produced any clear results, national trade unions are putting aside 
their mutual distrust and are reaching joint bargaining agreements on 
a decentralised national leve157, the attribution of European-level bar-
gaining mandates has been regulated at least on the union side, etc. 
This confirms, in my opinion, that for the first time ever we have 
European social partners with authority over their national organisa-
tions to socially impose the ECAs. The problem of whether they also 
have legal capacity to do so requires separate treatment, which we 
will see in the next section. 
" The first three requirements, in the cited Communication of 2002 on social 
dialogue, p. 18. The fourth appears next to the previous ones in the Communi-
cation on application of protocol on social policy of 1993, p. 17, and on adapting 
and promoting of social dialogue of 1998, p. 16. 
" "There is a social dialogue developing rapidly in multinational enterprises," 
it stated in its Communication of 20 May 1998, p. 16. 
56 France, Germany, Spain. 
5' The Doorn Agreements, of 5 November 1998, between German, Dutch and 
Luxembourg-based trade unions about the coordination of their bargaining poli-
cies, in particular, on attuning their wage policies, exemplify my point. Other 
examples are analysed in different chapters of this book. 
First we will wrap up what we have already seen with five reflec-
tions: 
— One, that the Council's decision can perform different func-
tions in its accompaniment of an ECA: to require all Member States 
to impose its application, extend its applicability to aB workers and 
employers, or both. 
— Two, that article 139 TEC adopts the concepts "decision" in 
a generic manner, which can be interpreted as both a Directive as a 
Decision or even a Regulation. 
— Three, that the type of Council decision to be chosen in each 
case does not depend on the type of Community action the ECA 
responds to — it might not even be a legislative initiative — but on 
the function assigned with respect to this. 
— Four, that each function has a type of decision best suited to 
achieving the expected result: A Directive, if it aims to apply the 
ECA through the Member States and with general applicability; a 
Regulation, if it is seeking general applicability and is directed at 
European workers and employers; and a Decision if it is seeking direct 
application, but only to workers and employers affiliated to the sign-
ing organisations. 
— Five, that the selection of one standard or another will 
also depend on the legal base or Community power of reference 
expressed in an article of the TEC that gives the upholds the granted 
support ". 
4. ORDINARY AGREEMENTS 
4.1. Phenomenology 
The debate about the possibility of their existence, begun not so 
long ago ", is now resolved by the presence of many European col- 
55 "The application of the Agreement contributes to the realization of the objec-
tives laid out in article 136 of the Treaty," states, for example, the preambles to 
Directives 1999/70/EC, referring to the framework agreement on fixed-term work 
and 1999/63/EC, regarding the sector Agreement on the working time of seafarers. 
"The application of the agreement contributes to the realization of the objectives 
envisaged in article 1 of the Social Policy Agreement," reads the preamble of Direc-
tive 97/8I/EC, referring to the Agreement on part-time work, which also cites the 
principies of subsidiarity and proportionality of article 3B of the Treaty. 
59 For NAVARRO NIETO, F., "La negociación colectiva en el Derecho comunitario 
del trabajo," REDT 102 (2000), 387, the collective agreement that he calls extra 
legem, aside from being possible, does not have to be subjected to the Commission's 
initiative, given that it is not going to be incorporated into Community legislative 
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lective agreements, both on the intersectoral and sectoral level. Not 
only have they emerged spontaneously, without any prodding by the 
Community, but they have not solicited a Council decision for an 
accompanying regulation either, despite meeting the Commission's 
requirements to request it, which we have just mentioned. 
As an initial observation with respect to ordinary ECAs, it might 
be mentioned that their requirements do not necessarily have to be the 
same as the reinforced ECA. For example, they do not have to see to 
the protection of small and medium-sized enterprises, nor do the 
signing parties have to be sufficiently representative, and the legality 
of their clauses does not have to meet the requirements of Community 
law. The reason stems from the fact that, although they are indeed 
European collective instruments, there is still no Community rule 
about them, so their initial legal identity is that of international con-
tracts subject to national laws applicable at any given time. Save for 
standards on legal authority contained in European Regulation 44/ 
2001 and the rules on conflict of the laws of the Rome Convention, 
an ECA signed in Brussels will be subject to Belgium law for certain 
matters and the national laws of the States where it will have effects 
for other ones. This is why article 139 expressly points out that when 
a Community Agreement is not applied based on a Council Decision, 
it will be done through the social partners' and the Member States' 
own procedures and practices. 
Gorelli, Valverde and Gordillo boil down into four the main 
technical problems with European bargaining 60:  a) who can be a bar-
gaining subject; b) what bargaining procedure is to be followed; c) 
what is the imperativeness of this type of agreement; and d) problems 
of articulation and complementarity between the European agreement 
and the national regulation. 
4.2. Binding force of ordinary European agreements, 
or common law agreements 
The alternative to application via Council decision is application 
through the social partners' and Member States' own procedures and 
procedure. For his part, CASAS BAAMONDE, M. E., "La negociación colectiva 
europea como institución democrática (y sobre la representatividad de los 'inter-
locutores sociales europeos')," Relaciones Laborales II (1998), pp. 78-9, makes a 
somewhat more restrictive interpretation of the issue based on the European Court 
of Justice ruling of 17 June 1998, UEAPME T-135/96. 
60 GÓMEZ GORDILLO, R.; GORELLI HERNÁNDEZ, J. and VALVERDE ASENCIO, A., 
Marco laboral y relaciones colectivas en la Unión Europea, Informe al Consejo 
Económico y Social de Andalucía, Seville, 2002, pp. 32-3. 
practices, as we have seen that article 139 TEC states. The Declara-
tion of the 11 High Contracting Parties of the SPA raid in 1992 that 
this method would consist of developing the content of ECAs through 
collective bargaining, in accordance with the rules of each Member 
State, which did not mean that the States had to apply the ECAs 
directly, transpose them with internal legislation, or modify their own 
legislation to adapt to them. Developing an ECA through collective 
bargaining subject to national norms did not seem to have any other 
sense than to transpose it through national agreements: 61 at the time, 
there had been no experience with anything different, since the only 
solid knowledge that could come close was the application of Direc-
tives through national agreements, and on the European level there 
were only the ambiguous processes developed in the Social Dialogue 
Committee 62. It was not until years later that the question was raised 
of whether sectoral ECAs were possible, or if they were restricted by 
the Social Policy Agreement, to which the Commission was forced 
to answer as late as 1998 that nothing in this Agreement prevented it, 
either as a supplement to interprofessional agreements or as independ-
ent agreement for the sector in question 63 With such little bargaining 
experience, it is more than likely that both the partners as well as the 
Commission were thinking about general or framework agreements, 
as ambiguous as the Directives until then, only a bit more than joint 
statements and opinions made by the parties in the Val Duchesse 
dialogue and in sectoral committees. A basket with so few straws 
would be incapable of developing on its own without the support of 
a Directive, being the only possible alternative reinforcement to make 
the national agreements reach the employers and workers. 
Under such restrictions, it is surprising that the Commission was 
open-minded enough to foresee the bargaining explosion that would 
come immediately after, and that was able to address it in a sustain-
able way. As early as 1993, its Communication on applying protocol 
to social policy 64 went further than a mere coup de chapeau to inde-
pendent bargaining and provided the right setting to say that, if the 
social partners decide "to voluntarily apply" the ECA, "the terms of 
61 ARRIGO, G., Il diritro del lavoro dell' Unione Europea, vol. I, Giuffré, Milan, 
1998, p. 188. 
62 "The most active dialogue at cross-industry level has in recent years taken 
place within the Socia] Dialogue Committee where the three cross-industry orga-
nisations of general vocation, UNICE, CEEP and ETUC, conduct their autonomous 
dialogue," read the Communication Adapting and Promoting the Social Dialogue 
at Community Level, cited, p. 13. 
63 Communication on Adapting and Promoting, cited, p. 14. 
66 Communication on Application of Protocol on Social Policy, cited, p. 17. 
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said agreement will be binding for its members, and will affect them 
only, and only in accordance with their own practices and procedures 
in their respective Member States." The European Commission' s 
manifesto could not be more clear or precise. Even the hasty limita-
tion evident in the Declaration of the 11 Contractual Parties, of de-
velopment through national agreements, is discreetly discarded in 
favour of a much broader expression, the voluntary application of 
ECAs, without specifying whether a second bargaining phase will be 
necessary on the national level or not. In the Declaration it is only 
emphatically stated that they will not have any sort of Community 
prerogative, such as, especially, erga omnes extension to all employ-
ers and workers in the Union. If in its diverse Communications on 
social dialogue, the Commission has established a series of require-
ments and effects, nothing said in them is applied to independent, free 
or ordinary ECA. The small legal scheme that has gradually devel-
oped along the unes of granting of general applicability is not en-
forceable for these, which are not going to receive such power, but 
rather the power that the legislation of each country gives them. 
As far as being a common instrument, ordinary ECAs are held to 
the rules of International Private Law, with one characteristic: they 
are not any sort of civil contract, but collective contracts, and the 
initially applicable regulatory block would be the one dedicated to 
collective bargaining by each Member State. It is difficult for a com-
mitment signed by trade union and employers' organisations on 
working conditions to be classified any other way in one of the 
Member States, although theoretically this could occur. Certain coun-
tries are very particular when it comes to classifying collective labour 
agreements, but even for these countries we might suggest a classi-
fication to this respect. Thus, Spain requires the intervening organ-
isations to meet a number of conditions, a rather rigid bargaining 
procedure that involves communicating its start to the labour author-
ities and specifying its clauses in writing, depositing it in an ad hoc 
registry and publishing it in the official bulletin. However, such 
conditions are required for collective agreements with erga omnes 
applicability, very officialised since the time of the Franco dictator-
ship, but not for agreements of limited applicability, which are sub-
ject to the basic rules of the Spanish Civil Code. In this sense, prac-
tically in all the countries, recognition as an agreement has somewhat 
different requirements than the ones the EU uses to decide to issue a 
back-up regulation: the consent of the parties, the valid mandate of 
the represented parties, a legal regulation consistent with national 
regulations and perhaps a written form are demanded, and not wheth-
er it adapts to EU rules, respect for SMUs or the representative char- 
acter of the parties'. Nor do the autonomous ECAs have to limit 
themselves to negotiable subjects indicated by the TEC in its article 
137 66, since the exclusion of issues like wages or unionisation is de-
rived from Community directives and, where applicable, back-up 
decisions for the related ECAs 67. 
Consideration as collective instruments is accompanied, in many 
countries, by binding effects over individual employment contracts, 
in accordance with national law or case law. Throughout Europe the 
supercontractuality of collective bargaining is recognised with the 
exception of the United Kingdom. 
4.3. The direct applicability of ECAs 
Some of the ECAs currently in force have specifically indicated 
the transposition route for national agreements to be applied. As if 
they were collective directives, they appeal to a second phase 
of bargaining, this time in each country, to reach workers and em-
ployers 68. 1 am not going to go into the problem of what happens 
65 The principies of freedom to bargain and mutual recognition, a determining 
factor in European collective bargaining, in the ruling UEAPME of the European 
Court of Justice, cited, substitute the recognition of the representativity made by 
the Commission with a view to the enactment of a reinforcing standard, but it raised 
other questions analysed by GORELLI HERNÁNDEZ, J., "El diálogo social en la Unión 
Europea: incidencia en el sistema de fuentes del Derecho," Temas Laborales 55 
(2000), p. 64, and SANGUINETI1 REYNAUD, W., "El papel de la autonomía colec-
tiva en la construcción del espacio social europeo," Carta Laboral 35 (2000), 
P. 9. 
66 Its text has been modified by the Nice Treaty, article 2.9, but in substance 
it requires a majority to promulgate Directives relating to certain matters, and 
unanimity for others, also excluding the subjects of wages, unionisation, strike and 
lockout. 
67  Article 139 TEC remits to article 137 for types of Council approval for back-
up decisions and has not been modified by the Nice Treaty to contain those 
produced in article 137, another example of the "interna] analytical misalignment" 
denounced by DUEÑAS HERRERO, L., Los interlocutores sociales europeos, Tirant, 
Valencia, 2002, 147 et sea. 
" The Framework Agreement on Telework, of 16 July 2002, indicates in its 
clause 12 that, in the context of article 139 TEC, it will be applied by members 
of UNICE-UEAPME, CEEP and CES (and its liaison committee EUROCADRES-
CEC) "in accordance with the specific procedures and practices for employers and 
workers in the Member States." In the doctrine that we might call classical, there 
is no other way of giving the ECA binding applicability that does not involve the 
backing of a Directive: "Agreements do not have regulatory effectiveness in 
themselves, in the sense that they do not immediately have a bearing on emplo-
yment relationships whose conditions they discipline...only as sources of compul-
sory bonds, to be made effective with consensual measures, so discipline of the 
agreed working conditions is made by way of the intemal contractual right." 
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when the national instruments do not transpone the content of the 
ECA, although in my opinion it would be impertinent to think of 
direct application, of consistent interpretation (Marleasing doctrine) 
or state liability (Wagner Miret doctrine): as the Communication on 
Protocol for Social Policy indicates, the applicability of ECAs will 
result from their own practices and procedures. 
But most express this in another way, and the strengthening of 
European collective bargaining allows us to venture the possibility of 
direct application, which does not need any intermediary mechanisms. 
What we might call style clauses in the ECA precisely alinde not to 
application through national agreements, but through European agree-
ments: this here Agreement — repeat the texts — does not limit the 
social partners' right to enter into agreements, on the appropriate 
level, even on the European level, that adapt or supplement their 
provisions so that they take into account the specific necessities of the 
affected social partners 69 
This has been the situation in Europe for 80 years now, in the first 
third of the 20th century, when collective bargaining is taking root 
everywhere as the ideal instrument for achieving social peace. A short 
time before the legislator of each country proclaimed binding appli-
cation for employment contracts, doctrine had found the legal expla-
nation of "unappealability" in Common Law, especially in Germany 
and Italy, and had ended up fiercely defending two types of expla-
nation: either the signing parties represented the will of the workers 
and employers according to the conferred mandate (theory of the 
mandate), or they did so by virtue of their belonging to the signing 
association (theory of association), but of course they had to accept 
what was agreed in their name, if it was outside of the granted pow- 
(SCHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, op. cit., p. 330, interpreting article 4.2 SPA). "That is, 
in that case the Community collective agreement would continue to be a recom-
mendational framework agreement, without any sort of legal effects, its application 
dependent on the inclusion of its content in the national collective bargaining of 
each Member State, in accordance with its respective regulatory legislation" 
(Compra, M.; RAMÍREZ, J. M. and SALA, T., Derecho Social Comunitario, cited, 
p. 560. Under current law, says ZACHERT, U., "Europaische Tarifvertrhge — von 
korporatistischer zur autonomer Normsetzung?", in VV.AA., Tarifautonomie für 
ein neues Jahrhundert (Festschrift Schaub), Beck'sche, Munich, 1998, p. 827, 
European agreements lack immediate applicability and require transposition via 
national organisations. For this eminent specialist, the mandate to bargain conferred 
by national organisations can harm — at least in Germany — the constitutional 
protection of collective autonomy. 
69 Framework ECA of 14 December 1995, on parental leave, clause 4; Fra-
mework ECA of 6 June 1997, on part-time work, clause 6; Framework ECA of 
18 Match 1999, on fixed-term work, clause 8. 
ers 7°. The key concept in both positions was the representation con-
ferred to bargain and acquire commitments in the name of, respec-
tively, the workers and the employers. 
Well then: the worker and the employer join an organisation, 
which directly signs an agreement or delegates another organisation 
to do so on a higher level. Those that sign a national agreement crown 
a line of representations that connects them to the bases. One step 
higher up, the European collective agreement connects its signing 
parties with the European bases through the chain of affiliations. 
Under these premises, is it totally necessary for a national federation 
affiliated to the signing organisation of the ECA to bargain a collec-
tive agreement to ratify its conformity with it? My answer is: not if 
the mandate conferred to the European organisation is clear. 
When presented with a case soliciting compliance of an ECA, the 
local court will have to examine several aspects. Let us suppose the 
question is the application of clause 9 of the Framework agreement 
on Telework, which says that the employer will allow the teleworker 
to meet with his or her colleague on a regular basis and access com-
pany information 71. As an internacional agreement subject to the Rome 
Convention of 19 June 1980 72, on legislation applicable to contractual 
obligations, the judge will have to prove the validity of the contract 
according to the legislation chosen by the parties (if this choice has 
not been expressed, the country with which they have the closest ties) 
as well as the agreement's applicability to the alleged place and sub-
jects, which involves a judgment of its validity as a collective instru-
ment in their own country — especially, respect for rules of public 
order — when what has been signed binds the parties of the lawsuit 73. 
7° I have developed this argument in greater detall in my article "¿Son 'meras 
recomendaciones' los acuerdos colectivos europeos?" in Relaciones Laborales, vol. 
I (1998), pp. 298-317. 
7' A future example: as clause 12 of the same Agreement indicates, "its 
application will be made in the three years following the signing of the agreement," 
that is, no later than 16 June 2005. 
72 The contractual capacity of signing associations is govemed, in my opinion, 
by the Agreement on recognition of the legal status of foreign companies, asso-
ciations and foundations, Bague Conference on International Private Law, 1 June 
1956. 
73 Useful for this is CARRILLO DEL Pozo, L. F., Alegación y prueba del Derecho 
extranjero en el ambito laboral y tutela judicial efectiva, REDT 111 (2002), 451 
et seq.: LUJÁN ALCARAZ, J., "La interpretación y aplicación del Derecho Comuni-
tario por el juez español: la cuestion prejudicial en el orden social", Aranzadi Social 
12 (1999), 9 et seq.; FERNÁNDEZ DOMÍNGUEZ, "Competencia judicial internacional 
y la Ley del contrato de trabajo en las relaciones internacionales", Actualidad 
Laboral III (1991), 533 et seq. On the subsidiary application of the lex fori for 
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It is pointless to say that the ECA only binds the affiliates 74, that 
is, that it will be regarded as a collective agreement of limited appli-
cability. In Spain the ECAs signed by CES and UNICE, organisations 
to which the most representative national head offices belong, would 
have general applicability if they did not lack other requirements, 
such as registration and publication in the official bulletin ", unless 
one of the following conditions had been met: either they were reg-
istered and published officially or at the request of a party 76, or if the 
local judge put the ECA on the level of a national agreement, just as 
the European citizen is on the same level as the national citizen for 
labour issues. 
The doctrine has raised another specific question in terms of the 
application of the ECAs, especially because they can serve to lower 
the levels reached by agreements in force ". For that reason, Zachert 
proposes a special formulation of the most favourable standard prin-
cipie, by virtue of which the ECA could only establish minimum 
conditions" opposed to national agreements. As far as Spain goes, 
given that an ECA of direct application is normally going to be 
considered as an agreement with limited applicability, the principie 
of the most favourable standard acts against agreements of general 
applicability, so the one with the better leve) of conditions for work-
ers would prevail. 
lack of accreditation of the foreign law, SSTC 33/2002 of I1 February, and TS 
of 22 May 2001 (AR 6477). 
" In countries like Spain, where there is no rule or common law doctrine on 
application when only one of the parties belongs to a signing organisation, the local 
court can do little except declare the ECA applicable, as neither by the conferred 
mandate nor by the representation held can it bind an employer or worker who 
has not shown his or her consent to it. Of course in Labour Law there are more 
measures of direct action to obtain application of the agreed terms. 
" Similarly, PÉREZ DE LOS COROS, El Derecho Social Comunitario, p. 148: the 
ECA is contractual in nature and is an extra-statutory agreement, but if at the 
European bargaining table the most representative Spanish organisations were 
represented and they had complied with the requirements laid out in anides 87 
et seq. ET, the agreement would have erga omnes or statutory validity in Spain. 
Article 2.f of Royal Decree 1040/1981 of 22 May indicates as the object of 
registration in the agreement registry, "any other agreement, arbitration award or 
pact that has the legal effects of an agreement. Article 2.c also requires cross-
industry agreements to be registered and on concrete matters of anide 83 of the 
Workers' Statute, which refers to agreements drawn up by the most representative 
national or regional organisations, so that they can be considered as such to the 
ECAs, when said organisations are represented in them. The response would be 
different if article 83 strictly alluded to agreements signed on a national or regional 
level. 
n This is the fear shown in Italy by ARRIGO, G., A proposito della compara-
zione, pp. 69 et seq. 
78 Europaische Tarifvertrage, p. 827. 
5. EUROPEAN ENTERPRISE AGREEMENTS 
Without the stir produced by the intersectoral and sectoral ECA, 
the multinational enterprise agreements subject to the Directive 94- 
45-EC have flooded the European space in a short time, and will 
probably constitute in the near future the real channel through which 
continental industrial relations take shape. In principie referring to 
the creation of European works councils or alternative formulas, the 
matters assigned as the competencies of these committees is leading 
to important agreements with the management of multinational com-
panies79. Their importance is proven by the swift appearance of ECJ 
doctrine in several rulings, of which we are interested in the one about 
Luxembourg: in the ECJ ruling of 21 October 1999, Commission v. 
the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg C-430/98, the Member State de-
fended itself of the accusation of not having duly transposed Direc-
tive 94/45/EC, saying that it had entrusted its application to collective 
bargaining and that most of the affected multinational firms had 
signed European works council agreements, except one or two of 
them, for which it had not deemed it necessary to enact a guarantee-
ing law. The ECJ found that precisely for this reason, the transposi-
tion of the Directive had not been totally safeguarded, and ruled 
against Luxembourg. 
How these enterprise agreements fit in the context of European 
bargaining is one of the issues that remains to be settled. The Com-
mission' s Communications on social dialogue allude to intersectoral 
and sectoral agreements, but not to those of a lower level". 
The appropriate place to debate these problems is in the chapter 
of this book on enterprise bargaining, to which I refer. 
"Particularly with respect to mobility, pensions and equivalency of qualifi-
cations," says the Communication on European Social Dialogue of 26 June 2002, 
p. 11. 
It will have to be examined whether an agreement signed between social 
partners, representatives of certain occupational categories or sectors, is sufficient 
basis for the Commission to suspend its legislative action, says the Communication 
on Protocol for Social Policy of 14 December 1993, p. 15. However, PÉREZ DE 
LOS COROS, El Derecho Social Comunitario en el Tratado de la Unión Europea, 
cited, pp. 157-8, considers that article 4 of the SPA (now anide 139) is a 
precarious framework, but a framework after all, for regulating these European 
enterprise agreements. 
